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IN THE SUPREl!E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
i.\L:.'.: OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
JOSE DeJESUS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19014 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Jose DeJesus, appeals from a conviction 
and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First Degree, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Jose DeJesus, was charged with Aggravated 
a felony of the First Degree, in violation of Title 76, 
6. Section 302, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Apoellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial and was 
to incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the 
t<·rminate term of not less than five years nor more than 
'll' 
RELIEf SOUGHT Otl ,\PPE,\L 
The appellant seeks to have the convict ion and j·1d 
rendered below reversed and to have the case remanded t» • 1, 
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are that on 
May 2, 1982, at approximately 2:10 p.m. three men entered 
Fankhauser Jewelery Store located at 1111 East 2100 South, Sal" 
Lake City, Utah, where the co-owner, Mrs. l1iriam Davis, and he, 
daughter, Shauna, were working (T. 15). The men were described 
as being dark-skinned, wearing trench coats with one carrying i 
shotgun (T. 24) , They were described as being be tween twenty 
twenty-eight years old. The Appellant was identified at trial 
by Mrs. Davis as being the individual carrying the shotgun (T.2· 
and forcing her to 1 ie face down behind the back counter (T. 27 · 
Although the Appellant was identified as the person who contlcu 
to hold the shotgun on Mrs. Davis, testimony of a Salt Lake Po;. 
Identification Technician was that fingerprints belonging to 
Appellant were found on the glass counter of a showcase across 
the room from where the Appellant was identified as standing 
(T.107-110). Jewelry valued at some $50,000.00 to $60,000.00 
was taken before the men left (T. 33). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
l'l!I::RE \iAS INSUFFICIEllT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY 
THE STATE TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A REASON-
DOUBT AS TO ANY OFFENSE. 
The jury found the Appellant guilty of Aggravated Robbery, 
a felony of the First Degree. The evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty of 
Aggravated Robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant asserted 
throughout the trial that he was in New York at the time the 
robbery occurred and, therefore, could not have participated in 
the robbery. 
Evidence was presented at trial that Mr. DeJesus was 
convicted of burglary, a second degree felony and was placed on 
probation by Judge Durham (T.160). As part of that probation, 
an interstate compact transfer was arranged. On January 22, 1982, 
: 1r. DeJe:ous was released from the county jail to go to the State 
of York (T.161). On May 17, 1982, a ticket was issued at 
the Airport in New York to Mr. DeJesus (T.:69), indicat-
ing that he was still in New York at that time, two weeks after 
robbery at issue had taken place. 
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (1983), this 
'J'irt stated, " ... notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of 
jur:1's decision this Court still has the right to review the 
of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, the 
-3-
Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence onlv when 
the evidence (viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict) is 
sufficiently inconclusive or in-
herently improbable that reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he was convicted. 
Id. (Citations ommitted.) 
In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1980), the dissent note 
If the circumstances essential for 
conviction, are ambiguous and con-
sistent with the innocence of the 
accused, then this Court must hold 
as a matter of law that there is no 
usbstantial evidence to support the 
guilt of the accused. 
This standard restates the Due Process requirements which prohi 
a criminal conviction in all cases except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the cr:a" 
with which a defepdant is charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
Viewed against this background, Appellant contends tha'. 
there was insufficient evidence presented to place him in 
much less in Salt Lake City robbing a jewelry store on :-lay 3. 
1982. No evidence was presented by the State to rebut the 
evidence that Mr. DeJesus had purchased an airplane ticket in 
New York fully two weeks after the robbery. Given this evidenc, 
the jury could not have found Appellant gui 1 t y beyond a reason& 
doubt and the conviction for aggravated robberv cannot stanJ 
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POINT II 
1:!E COURT ERRED IN FAILitlG TO GIVE A 
T_:JSTRUCTIOtl REGARDitlG IDENTIFICATION. 
The Appellant requested a separate instruction regarding 
ewitness identification. The issue was raised at trial as to 
che descriptions of the robbers given by the victims shortly 
after the incident. Two of the victims, Mariam and Shauna Davis, 
independently described the robber as Iranian (T.49 & 77). The 
Appellant in this case is of Spanish decent. Despite this 
rliscrepancy, the trial court refused to give the requested instruc-
tion regarding identification. 
This Court has articulated the standard for when an 
instruction should be given. In State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 
1213 (Utah 1980), this Court stated: 
A defendant's entitlement to a jury 
instruction on his theory of the case 
is not absolute. It is necessarily 
conditional upon the existence of a 
reasonable basis in the evidence to 
justify the giving of the proposed 
instruction. (Citations ommitted). 
The Appellant in the instant case claims that he was not the robber, 
that he 11as in tlew York at the time of the incident and so the 
eyewitnesses identification was mistaken. Based on the testimony 
that he had purchased an airline ticket in New York after the 
·ohbery had taken place in Salt Lake City (T.169), there would 
to be the necessary evidence to justify the instruction 
identification. 
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The dangers inherent in eyewitness identific::itL,in "' [,"" 
have been the subject of discussion for many vears Tn an 
quoted passage, the late Felix Frankfurter, former Uni tc>d ,, , 
Supreme Court Justice, observed: 
What is the worth of identification 
testimony even when uncontradicted? 
The identification of strangers is 
proverbially untrustworthy. The 
hazards of such testimony are establish-
ed by a formidable number of instances 
in the records of English and American 
trials. These instances are recent--
not due to the brutalities of ancient 
criminal procedure. 
Evidence as to identity based on 
personal impressions, however bona 
fide, is perhaps of all classes of 
evidence the least to be relied upon, 
and therefore, unless supported by 
other facts, an unsafe basis for the 
verdict of a jury. Frankfurter, The 
Trial of Sacco and Vanzetti. 
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has been' 
documented in the literature, and numerous law review articles 
1 been written on the subject in recent years. The commentators 
1 
Did Your E es Deceive You? Ex ert Ps cholo ical 
on the Unre ia i ity o Eyewitness I entification, Stan, 
969 (1977); Due Process Standards fo:;: the Admissibilit of Eve-
witness Identification Evi ence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 7 ; £'.,,,, 
witness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No, 
407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face 
Identification, 3 Nat'. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of 
Identification Evicl.,"c"' in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L,Q, 361 (1 
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimon{ (1979); Public Defender Sourcebook 
pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 976); Yarmey, The Psvchology of 
witness Testimony (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of Evewitness 
Perf?rmance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc' y, 191: BJ: 
Eyewitness Identification andPsychology in the Courtroom, _ 
Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9· Buckhout Evewitness Testimonv, Sc1en 
Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Levine & The Ps·1chulo•,"' ot Cr_imi.r 
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: 
1
: it reasons for this unreliability are found in the problems 
.i:;sociated with human perception and memory, both of 
a vital role in eyewitness identification. A lengthy 
of those problems are found in a law review article 
with the problems of perception and memory which are 
associated with hearsay testimony.2 With respect to those issues, 
the author noted: 
1 
At a basic level, perception is 
determined by objective structural 
factors such as the nature of the 
stimulus, the impact of the stimulus 
on the sense organs according to 
various physical laws; the operation 
of the afferent neural pathways from 
the sense organs to the brain, and 
the cortical projection or reconstruc-
tion of the stimulus. However, the 
neurological system operates to trans-
duce physical energy into a sensation, 
it is clear that interpretation is 
required to transform sensation into 
meaning. 
In organizing raw sensory input, the 
central nervous system is not a photo-
graphic recorder. . . Injury, pathology, 
drugs, youth, and senility can seriously 
impair the accuracy of these processes. 
1970 Utah Law Rev. at 9. 
(continued) Identification: The Ga from Wade to Kirb , 
U. Pa. L.Rev. 1079 (1973 ; Luce, The Neglected Dimension in 
E11ewitness Identification, Crim. Def., May-June 1977 at 5-8; 
Tnrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibilitf the Sights 
of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 1976 . 
Stewart, Perception, Memort and Hearsay: A Criticisim of 
Pn"sPnt La\v and the Proposed Feder a Rules of Evidence, 1970 Utah 
I i.\1 l"{0V . I . 
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In United States v. Barber, 4l:' c 2J SU (3rd Cir 
the court gave a similar description of the processes in,}():_ 
in human observation, perception and memor:.' It then ','L'J1, 
to state, with respect to eyewitness identification 
Eyewitness identification testimony, 
therefore, is an expression of a 
belief or impression by the witness. 
If there is a high degree of precision 
and certainty in his expression, which 
is consistent with any prior statements 
and unshaken on cross-examination, the 
statement of the witness may be regarded 
as a statement of fact. If certainty 
is lacking, the expression is deemed to 
possess an evidentiary quality of inferior 
rank. Thus, where the circumstances 
surrounding the criminal act gave limited 
opportunity for observation or utilization 
of the sensory perception, or where, un-
certainty is expressed by the witness 
himself, or exposed by a past history of 
the witness's statements or demonstrated 
by cross-examination, the statement of 
identity should be considered as only an 
expression of opinion and should be 
accompanied by appropriate instructions 
as to its sufficiency and weight. To be 
sure, the courts have been generous in 
the admission of eyewitness identification 
in order to permit the jury to make its 
own assessment. The emphasis has been on 
inclusion of evidence, rather than exclusion, 
on credibility, rather than admissibility. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 412 F.2d at 527. 
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), 
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a 
photographic array was impermissibily suggestive in violation 
of the petitioner's right to Due Process of Law. In doing so, 
the court discussed the dangers associated with the use of 
photographic identifications, stating: 
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It must be recognized that improper 
employment of photographs by police 
mav sometimes cause witnesses to err 
in. identifying criminals. A witness 
may have obtained only a brief glimpse 
of a criminal, or may have seen him 
under poor conditions. Even if the 
police subsequently follow the most 
correct photographic identification 
procedures and show him the pictures 
of a number of individuals without 
indicating whom they suspect, there 
is some danger that the witness may 
make an incorrect identification. 
This danger will be increased if the 
police display to the witness only 
the picture of a single indivdual 
who generally resembles the person he 
saw, or if they show him the pictures 
of several persons among which the 
photograph of a single such individual 
recurs or is in some way emphasized. 
(Footnote omitted.) 390 U.S. at 383. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 
1263 (Kan. 1981), discussed those general problems at length 
are associated with the use of eyewitness identification 
e'Ji dence. The court then took note of the particular prol;>lems 
arise in the courtroom with that evidence: 
In spite of the great volume of articles 
on the subject of eyewitness testimony 
by legal writers and the great deal of 
scientific research by psychologists in 
recent years, the courts in this country 
have been slow to take the problem 
seriously and, until recently, have not 
taken effective steps to confront it. 
ThE trouble is that many judges have 
assumed that an "eveball" witness, who 
identifies the accused as the criminal, 
is the most reliable of witnesses,and 
if there are any questions about the 
identification, the jurors, in their 
wisdom, are fully capable of determining 
the credibility of the witness without 
special instructions from the court. 
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Yet cases of mistaken identification 
are not infrequent and the of 
misidentification has not been 
alleviated. 
We note, for example, a 1979 unrep•1rteJ 
prosecution in Wilmington, Delaware, 
against Rev. Bernard T. Pagano, a 
Roman Catholic priest, accused of robbing 
six Delaware stores in the winter of 
1978. At the trial, he was falselv 
identified by several state 
as the robber. After the State rested 
its case, the prosecution was dismissed 
on motion of the State because another 
man confessed to the crime. Closer to 
home is the case of Ronald Quick, who 
was twice tried and convicted of aggravated 
robbery of a liquor store in Hutchinson. 
At both trials two eyewitnesses positively 
identified defendant as the perpetrator of 
the crime. These two convictions were 
reversed for trial errors in State v. 
Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979) 
ancr2'"2 9 Kan . 11 7 , 6 21 P . 2 d 9 9 7 (19 81 ) . 
The case was dismissed by the State during 
the third trial after another man, who 
looked like the defendant, confessed to 
the crime. 
The Kansas procedure does provide certain 
safeguards to prevent the conviction of 
an innocent accused on the basis of un-
reliable eyewitness identification. Our 
trial courts have the power to suppress 
eyewitness testimony, if the eyewitness 
identification procedure rendered the 
testimony unreliable. Cross-examination 
and argument by defense counsel afford 
some protection. Unfortunately, these 
procedures have not solved the problem. 
Able defense counsel have attempted to 
combat unreliable eyewitness identifica-
tion by two additional methods: They 
have called to the witness stand expert 
witnesses in the field of psychology to 
testify as to the various factors which 
may cause eyewitness identificaiton to he 
unreliable. They have also requested Lhe 
trial court to give a cautionary instruc-
tion stating the factors to be considered 
-10-
bv the jury in weighing the credibility 
of eyewitness testimony. 635 P.2d at 
1241. 
1 cdse, the trial court refused to allow the defense to 
her of these actions. Elizabeth Loftus, an expert on 
ew1tness identification, was not allowed to testify and the 
·01irt refused to give the same instruction as appellant requested 
in this case. After a lengthy discussion on the use of expert 
restimonv to solve the problems associated with the eyewitness 
restimony, the Kansas court stated: 
After considering these cases and the 
literature on the subject, we have 
concluded that requiring trial courts 
to admit this type of expert evidence 
is not the answer to the problem. We 
believe that the problem can be allevi-
ated by a proper cautionary instruction 
to the jury which sets forth the factors 
to be considered in evaluating eyewitness 
testimony. Such an instruction, coupled 
with vigorous cross-examination and 
persuasive argument by defense counsel 
dealing realistically with the short-
comings and trouble spots of the 
identification process, should protect 
the rights of the defendant and at the 
same time enable the courts to avoid 
the problems involved in the admission 
of expert testimony on this subject. 
635 P.2d at 1243. 
The instruction that the Kansas court held should be 
,iven was that framed by the United States Court of Appeals for 
:lie District of Columbia in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
'3" (D.C. Cir. 1972).3 The Telfaire court described the need 
--j 
This same instruction was cited with approval by Justice 
rcwdrt in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 
11 0J (Utah 1982), and as requested by appellant in this case. 
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for such an instruction, stating: 
The presumption of innocence that Sdfe-
guards the common law system must be d 
premise that is realized in instruction 
and not merely a promise. In pursuance 
of that objective, we have pointed out 
the importance of and need for a special 
instruction on the key issue of identifi-
cation, which emphasized to the jury the 
need for finding that the cirumstances 
of the identification are convincing 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This need 
was voiced in 1942 in McKenzie v. United 
States, [126 F.2d 533] and it has been 
given vitality in our opinions of recent 
years--following the Supreme Court's 1966 
Wade-Gilbert [v. California, 388 U.S. 263 
87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1178 (1967)] 
Stovall [v. Denno, 383 U.S. 293] trilogy 
focusing on the very real danger of mis-
taken identidication as a threat to 
justice. We refer to our post-Wade 
opinions in Gregory [v. United states, 
369 F.2d 185 (1966)] and Macklin [v. 
United States, 409 F.2d 174 (1969)) 
These opinions sought to take into 
account the traditional recognition 
that identification testimony presents 
speical problems of reliability by 
stressing the importance of an identifi-
cation instruction even in case meeting 
the constitutional threshold of admissi-
bility. [Footnotes ommitted.] 469 F.2d 
at 555. 
In State v. Warren, supra, the court held that the moJe: 
instruction from the Telfaire case was more appropriate than a 
-12-
i- , I t n" true t ion dea 1 ing with an identification defense. 4 
. we have considered the fact that 
trial courts are often required to 
determine the admissibility of eyewitness 
testimony where issues of unreliability 
are raised. As pointed out by Chief 
Justice Schroeder in State v. Ponds, 227 
Kan. 627, 608 P.2d 946, in testing the 
reliability of identification testimony, 
the five factors mentioned in Neil v. 
Biggers, [ 490 U.S. 188 (1972)] should be 
considered by the trial court. If these 
five factors should be considered in 
determining the admissiblity of the 
testimony, it would seem even more appro-
priate to require the jury to consider 
The general instruction given in that case provided: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be 
given the testimony of each witness. You have a right to use that 
knowledge and experience which you possess in common with men in 
general in considering the testimony of each witness. You also 
may take the following factors into consideration when weighing 
a witness' testimony: 
(a) The witness' ability and opportunity to observe 
and know the things about which he had testified; 
(b) The clarity and accuracy of the witness' memory; 
(c) The witness' manner and conduct while testifying; 
(d) Any interest the witness may have in the result of 
che trial; and 
(e) The reasonableness of the witness' testimony when 
considered in light of all the evidence in the case; and 
(f) Any bias, interest, prejudice or motive the witness 
'!lil" have. 
If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely 
anv material matter, you have a right to distrust the 
.1 irnunv of witness in other matters, and you may reject all or 
.1rt of testimonv of that witness, you you may give it such 
i.;ht as ·1ou think it deserves. You should not reject any testimony 
lti1out 635 P.2d at 1245. 
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the same factors in weighing the 
credibility of the eyewitness identi-
fication testimony. Otherwise the 
might reasonably conclude that the 
admission of the evidence by the trial 
court vouched for its reliability. We 
think it clear that, in order to prevent 
potential injustice, some standards must 
be provided the jury so that the credibil-
ity of eyewitness identification testimony 
can be intelligently and fairly weighed. 
The giving of such an instruction will 
take only a couple of minutes in trial 
time and will be well worth it, if some 
future injustices can be avoided. 635 
P.2d at 1244. [Emphasis by court.] 
In Neil v. Biggers, supra, the United States Supreme Cour: 
was addressing the issue of the admissiblity of eyewitness ident'.: 
cation evidence based on a showup procedure. 5 In determining the 
admissibility of the evidence the court initially noted that you 
must consider the totality of the circumstances. The court then 
listed several factors to consider, stating: 
5 
As indicated by our cases, the factors 
to be considered in evaluating the 
likelihood of misidentification include 
the opportunity of the witness to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime, 
the witness' degree of attention, the 
accuracy of the witness' prior description 
of the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time 
between the crime and the confrontation. 
409 U.S. at 199. 
That procedure involved two detectives walking the 
petitioner past a rape victim. 
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Fur these same reasons a number of other jurisdictions 
,_nmd that the model instruction from United States v. 
- ,ire. supra, should be given when warranted by the circumstances 
0 case.6 
In Utah, the Telfaire instruction was cited with approval 
Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose, 
649 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1982). In that case the majority opinion did 
not squarely address the issue of the requirement of such an 
instruction. The court did not find reversible error in the 
trial court's refusal to give the instruction. The primary 
reason the court gave for that holding was that defense counsel 
failed to take exception to the trial court's refusal to give that 
instruction. The c,ourt then stated, "We have not heretofore held 
that such an instruction is required. We believe the giving of it 
should be left to the discretion of the trial court," 649 P.2d at 
The Telfaire instruction specifically has either recommend-
ed or approved for use in numerous jurisdictions as reflected by 
the following cases: United States v. Holly, 502 F.2c 273 (4th Cir. 
1974); United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir.1975); State 
''· Benjamin, 363 A.2d 762 (Conn. 1976); State v. Calia, 514 P.zcr--
1354 (Or. App. 1973), cert. den. 417 U.S. 917 (1974); Commonwealth 
·1. Rodriguez, 391 N.E. 2d 889 (Mass. 1979); United States v. 
Kavanau2h, 572 F. 2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Dodge, 
538 F. 2 770 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. den., 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); 
United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.) cert. den., 426 
".S. 908 (1976); United States v. O'Neal, F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 
lg74); United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1972); 
v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 269, 421 N.E. 2d 157 (1981); State 
" Pa·me, 230 S.E. 2d 72 (W. Va. 1981); United States v. Cueto, 
1273 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Guzman, 121 Cal. Rptr. 
' 1 !.+7 Cal. App. 3d 380 (Cal. App. 1975); State v. Motes, 215 S.E. 
J l'JO (S.C. 1075); State v. Pazue, 280 S.E. 2d 72 (W.Va. 1981); 
v. 649 P. 2d 56 Utah 1982) (Stewart, J. dissent-
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61. Justice Stewart wrote a dissent to that part of the coun, 
opinion and Justice Durham concurred in that dissent. 
Previously, this court had decided that it not 
reversible error to give an instruction similar to that given 
in State v. Warren, supra, State v. Schaffer, 683 P.2d 1185 (lcr 
1981). It is interesting to note that State v. Schaffer, supra, 
was not even cited in the Malmrose case. In Schaffer, the couc 
did not say there was no error in refusing to give the ins tructioc 
but rather, the court reasoned that because other general 
tions on credibility and burden of proof were given, the jury ''a' 
adequately advised on what the law was. Secondly, the court 
noted that there were two eyewitnesses who had abundant opportur;; 
to observe the defendant, thus alleviating any prejudice. The 
court concluded that the refusal to give the instruction did not 
constitute "reversible error" [emphasis added]. 638 P. 2d at nr 
Similarly in State v. Mccumber, 622 P. 2d 353 (Utah 1980) 
the issue of the refusal to given an instruction on eyewitness 
identification was raised. 7 With respect to that issue this 
court stated: 
7 
A criminal defendant is entitled to 
have ajury instructed on his theory 
of the case if there is any substantial 
evidence to justify such an instruction. 
Where, however, the requested instruction 
is denied, no prejudicial error occurs 
if it appears that the giving of the 
requested instruction would not have 
affected the outcome of the trial. 
Moreover, a defendant is not entitled 
to an instruction which is redundant 
The test of the instruction was not included in the or: 
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or repetitive of principles enunciated 
in other instructions given to the 
jury. The principal points of defend-
ant's proposed instruction dealt with 
the State's burden of proof and the 
factors to consider in weighing the 
testimony of an eyewitness. All of 
these factors were adequately dealt 
with in other instructions presented 
to the jury by the trial court. As a 
result, we cannot agree that the denial 
of the proposed instruction constituted 
reversible error. [Footnote ommitted.] 
622 P.2d at 359. 
The general conclusions that can be reached about these 
cases are: First of all, this court has never said that such 
an instruction is improper and should not be given. Secondly, 
the court has clearly implied that under certain circumstances 
the identity instruction would be proper. Finally, the court 
in all of these cases, spoke in terms of no reversible error 
indicating that due to the nature of the cases, even though there 
may have been error, there was no prejudice to the appellants. 
Several other principles of Utah law which were dealt 
with only in passing or not mentioned at all in those cases, must 
be discussed here. Under the law of Utah a criminal defendant 
is entitled of have his theory of the case presented to the jury 
in the form of written instructions, State v. Stenbeck, 78 U.S. 
350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), State v. McCumber, supra. With respect 
to defenses, a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury 
that the defense need only raise a reasonable doubt. 
t_Ji_P v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v. Torres, 619 
'I 694 (Utah 1980); and State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981). 
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The mere fact that the court gave general instrucrions on r!,, 
presumption of innocence and burden of proof does not c1 l le: ·Lie 
the prejudice in refusing to instruct the jury with t 
the defendant's burden in establishing his defense. This cour· 
has held that a jury need not 
. . . go through such a tortuous process 
when that result could have been achieved 
by giving the defendant's requested instruc-
tion, or one of that substance. State v. 
Torres, supra, at 696. 
In this case there was no instruction given which explai:.' 
to the jury what the defense was, nor was there any instruction 
given which explained to the jury what the burden of proof was 
with respect to a defense. Consequently, it was error not to 
give an instruction explaining to the jury what the defense was. 
and relating that portion of the evidence to the reasonable doubc 
standard. The polictes above, are substantial and compelling. 
That instruction is clearly a necessary and proper one and it ;m 
error to refuse to give it to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant maintained that he could not have been t'ie 
perpetrator of the robbery as he was in new York at the time tr.e 
robbery occurred. The only testimony that refuted this was the 
identification of the Appellant by the victims. Despite the 
accepted problems inherent in eyewitness identificaiton, the 
court failed to give a separate instruction regarding eyewitnes· 
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1 '" i ! i 1'ation and the problems with such identification. Because 
'.umulative error of insufficient evidence to maintain 
1nviction based on the alibi defense and the failure to 
the eyewitness identification instruction, the trial court 
,:ummi t ted reversible error and this conviction cannot stand. 
Respectfully submitted this 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
<-= ,·, ' i 
T,ake City, Utah 84114, this day Lt 1l 
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